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Abstract
Collective action is the result of the efforts of groups consisting of many individuals. This
gives rise to strategic interactions: the decision of an individual to participate in collective
action may depend on the efforts of both like-minded and opposing activists. This paper
causally studies such strategic interactions in the context of left- and right-wing protests
in Germany. In an experiment, we investigated whether randomly varied information
on turnout of both like-minded and opposing movements impacts activists’ willingness
to protest. In response to information about high turnout of their own group, left-wing
activists increased their willingness to protest, consistent with theories of conditional
cooperation. In contrast, right-wing activists decreased their willingness to protest, con-
sistent with instrumental accounts and free-riding motives. For both groups, there was
no significant reaction to information about turnout of the opposing movement. The re-
sults highlight substantial heterogeneity in strategic interactions and motives across the
political spectrum.
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1 Introduction
In theories of collective action, social and political outcomes are determined by the ef-
forts of many individual actors who organize in political groups (Olson, 1965). This con-
dition creates a situation of strategic interaction: when an activist participates in a move-
ment, their impact depends on the group size and efforts of both like-minded and op-
posing activists. The theoretical and empirical study of such strategic interactions within
and between political movements has received significant interest in various disciplines
studying human behavior, including political science (Lohmann, 1994; Shadmehr, 2018;
Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011; Tarrow, 1996), and sociology (Meyer and Staggenborg,
1996; Opp and Gern, 1993; Tilly, 1978). Yet, the existing empirical evidence is mostly cor-
relational, ex-post, and does not rely on micro-level data on activists, but rather operates
at aggregate levels which renders it difficult to identify strategic interactions between
activists at the individual level. This article circumvents these identification problems by
presenting an experiment to causally study at the individual level the qualitative nature
and quantitative extent of strategic interactions between both like-minded and opposing
political activists.
From a theoretical perspective, predictions regarding the nature of strategic inter-
actions are ambiguous and fundamentally depend on the relative strength of different
motivational forces.1 In canonical models of collective action that posit instrumental con-
siderations, free-riding incentives induce strategic substitutability among activists within
the same movement (Hardin, 2015; Olson, 1965): an individual activist has a lower in-
strumental incentive to participate in collective action if the group size of like-minded
peers increases. Vice versa, instrumental accounts predict strategic complementarity be-
tween activists of opposing movements (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and San-
droni, 2006): activists of one movement have an additional instrumental incentive to
participate in collective action if the group size of opposing activists becomes larger.
A purely instrumental account of political behavior is, however, unlikely to be com-
plete (Green et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2015). Various alternative models of collective
1Appendix Section D provides a formal conceptual framework which discusses the relevant mechanisms
driving effort choices.
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action make predictions about the nature of strategic interactions between political ac-
tivists which are in conflict with those of standard models. Theories that posit conditional
cooperation (Dawes et al., 1986; Frey and Meier, 2004), reciprocity (Lubell and Scholz,
2001), the enforcement of social norms (Ostrom, 2000), and the quality of political partic-
ipation as a relational good (Uhlaner, 1989b) predict strategic complementarity among
like-minded activists within the same political movement. In these theories, individu-
als receive additional expressive benefits from participation when their peers contribute
more to collective action.
Likewise, strategic interactions between activists of opposing movements do not nec-
essarily exhibit strategic complementarity as predicted by standard instrumental accounts.
For instance, in theories of social identity, threats to group identity can possibly dis-
courage activists to take political action for their group (Brown, 2000; Hager et al., 2020;
Huddy and Mason, 2008), giving rise to strategic substitutability in effort choices of ac-
tivists of opposing movements. Similarly, bandwagon effects postulate that activists will
shy away from taking political action for their movement if the opposing movement
increases its dominance (McAllister and Studlar, 1991). Finally, threshold models of col-
lective behavior can rationalize strategic substitutability between activists of different
political movements in the case where one group consolidates its power (Granovetter,
1978). Given these conflicting theoretical predictions, the nature of strategic interactions
of political activists is ultimately an empirical question.
This paper experimentally investigates strategic participation decisions in right-wing
movements and left-wing countermovements in Germany. For both sides of the politi-
cal spectrum, we study how individuals’ decisions to attend a rally depend on both the
expected turnout of the own political group and turnout of the competitor. Our study
takes place in the context of two high-stakes rallies organized by the right-wing party Al-
ternative für Deutschland (henceforth, AfD) in Berlin on May 27 2018 as well as in Erfurt on
May 1 2019. In response to the announcements of these rallies, civil society organizations
and political parties mobilized their followers to participate in left-wing counterrallies.
A few days before the events, we recruited a sample of both supporters of the AfD rally
and supporters of the counterrally, predominantly through social media. Within an on-
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line survey, we randomly assigned respondents to receive either a high or low expert
forecasts about the turnout separately for the AfD rally and the left-wing counterrally.
We then study how this information provision afffects activists’ willingness to partici-
pate in the rally.
By studying a setting of rallies and counterrallies, this paper presents the first causal
investigation of individual participation in political activism in response to expected ef-
fort of both the own political group and the competitor. In standard models of collective
action, participation is modeled as a simple public good game: private instrumental re-
turns decrease in the effort of the own political group (Olson, 1965) and increase in that of
the competitor (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006). Therefore, one’s
own turnout decision should exhibit strategic substitutability regarding peer turnout and
strategic complementarity regarding competitor turnout. However, multiple alternative
channels might mitigate or reverse these mechanisms. Social motives, for instance, may
be a force for conditional cooperation within the own political camp (Ostrom, 2000), lead-
ing to strategic complementarity in own and peer turnout. Alternatively, participation
costs may decrease in the size of the own group, similarly leading to strategic comple-
mentarity in peer turnout (Barbera and Jackson, 2020; Edmond, 2013). In addition, the
enjoyment value of attending a rally may decrease in competitor turnout as people may
prefer to be part of the bigger movement, thus inducing substitutability in own and com-
petitor turnout. Importantly, there might be substantial variation in these forces between
different political camps, generating heterogenous patterns of strategic interaction. Our
experimental design and setting allow us to assess the aggregate effect of these forces on
the individual turnout decision.
Our analysis yields three main findings. First, we find no evidence that respondents
react to the turnout of the competitor rally. For both followers of the left-leaning coun-
termovement and the right-wing movement, there is only a muted and insignificant in-
crease in response to larger competitor turnout. By contrast there is substantial respon-
siveness to turnout within the own political group. Our second main finding reveals that
for supporters of the left-wing countermovement, own and peer turnout are strategic
complements. Left-leaning individuals who see high predicted turnout at their own rally
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are 5.8 percentage points (23%) more likely to be certain to participate. Third, for sup-
porters of the right-wing rally, we find the reverse: supporters’ own and peer turnout are
strategic substitutes. Right-wing supporters who are presented high predicted turnout
at the AfD rally are 6.1 percentage points (15%) less likely to report certain participation.
Our evidence thus highlights that activists are responsive to the turnout of their own
rally, but not to the turnout of the competitor rally. Moreover, within the same context,
activists from the left and the right respond in different ways to information about the
expected size of their own rally.
What explains differences in behavior across supporters of the right-wing rally and
the left-wing counterrally? Based on additional survey evidence collected after the rallies
had taken place, we find that left-wing activists know significantly more people that
previously participated in a rally compared to right-wing activists. This suggests that
left-leaning activists may have stronger social motives for participating in a rally and that
motives for conditional cooperation are larger. Left-wing activists are also significantly
more likely to agree with the statement that they “enjoy taking part in rallies.” This
suggests that incentives to free-ride are lower on the political left as activists place more
weight on the consumption value of rallying. At the same time, we rule out differences
in risk preferences, competitiveness, and beliefs about protest effectiveness as potential
mechanisms underlying the heterogeneity across movements.
Our findings contribute to a long-standing literature analyzing the causes of political
participation in democracies (Coate and Conlin, 2004; Downs, 1957; Enos and Hersh,
2015; Han, 2016; Holbein, 2017; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1994; Shadmehr,
2018; Shadmehr and Bernhardt, 2011; Uhlaner, 1989a). More specifically, we add to a
literature studying the motivation of protesters (Bursztyn et al., 2020; Cantoni et al., 2019;
González, 2020; Lohmann, 1994) and political activists (Enos and Hersh, 2015; Hager et
al., 2019, 2020). Mcclendon (2014) provides field-experimental evidence that the promise
of social esteem boosts participation at a gay and lesbian pride event. Cantoni et al.
(2019) examine student protests against authoritarianism in Hong Kong and find that
protesters’ effort choices exhibit strategic substitutability.2
2For a review of the literature on information provision experiments, see Haaland et al. (2020).
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Compared to previous studies, our design and setting are novel in three key respects.
First, our paper provides the first evidence on strategic interactions within and between
political movements. Second, our setting allows us to study the heterogenous participa-
tion decisions of supporters of different movements within the same environment and
employing the same treatment manipulation. The setting is therefore ideal to study het-
erogeneity in strategic interactions across political movements. Third, we exploit fully
exogenous variation in beliefs by providing people with different expert forecasts about
the likely turnout of the rallies. Previous studies provided control group respondents
with no information, i.e., identification hinged on prior beliefs. Since prior beliefs may
be measured with error and correlated with both observables and unobservables, causal
identification and the interpretation of heterogeneous treatment effects are more difficult.
Our study circumvents this issue by providing fully exogenous forecasts to all respon-
dents.
Our paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the setting and the experimental
design. Section 3 presents the results before we conclude in Section 4. Appendix Section
D provides a simple conceptual framework which discusses the relevant mechanisms
driving substitutability and complementarity in effort choices.
2 Setting and Experimental Design
2.1 The Right-Wing “Alternative for Germany” (AfD)
Our study takes place in the context of two rallies organized by the “Alternative for
Germany” (AfD), a German political party. Founded in 2013, the AfD falls on the right
to far-right end of the political spectrum. During the so-called refugee crisis of 2015, the
party shifted its traditionally economic platform to a more anti-immigration and socially
conservative one. The shift saw a massive increase in support for the party, which took
over 20 percent of the vote in regional elections in 2016. In the 2017 national election, the
AfD gained 12.6 percent of the vote and secured 94 seats in the German parliament.
The AfD’s current official party platform espouses conservative positions (e.g., tradi-
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tional gender roles, restrictions on abortions) as well as explicitly racist ideas (e.g., the
rejection of a multicultural Germany and of Islam). As such, scholars contend that the
AfD activates and perpetuates deeply rooted xenophobic ideology from the Nazi regime
(Arzheimer and Berning, 2019; Cantoni et al., 2020).
To advance its political influence, the AfD regularly organizes rallies against the fed-
eral government and its policies. AfD members are actively encouraged to participate.
The success of the AfD in recent years as well as its mobilization efforts on the streets
have been highly controversial. According to national polls, over 50% of Germans per-
ceive the AfD as a threat for democracy.3 As a consequence, rallies organized by the
AfD typically attract counterrallies by left-wing parties and organizations who want to
publicly voice their opposition to the AfD. Two influential rallies and counterrallies took
place in Berlin on May 27 2018 and in Erfurt on May 1 2019. Both rallies generated sig-
nificant media attention and constitute the setting of our experiment.
2.2 Setting
2018 Rally in Berlin On May 27th 2018, the AfD organized a rally in Berlin under
the slogan “Future Germany” (Zukunft Deutschland). The rally’s stated goal was to ex-
press dissatisfaction with the policies of the current Merkel administration. The AfD’s
leadership officially encouraged its supporters to attend the rally and, to some extent,
organized and subsidized transport from regions outside of Berlin. The rally was pro-
moted to AfD members through internal communication channels and on social media.
In response to the rally announcement of the AfD, the political alliance “Stop Hatred”
(Stoppt den Hass) organized a counterrally on the same day in Berlin. Stop Hatred was
supported by all major left-leaning parties, Germany’s main trade-union association as
well as a host of civil society organizations. In total, 5,000 people turned out for the AfD
rally and 25,000 people joined the counterrally.
2019 Rally in Erfurt Roughly a year later on May 1st, 2019, the AfD initiated another
rally in Erfurt, the state capital of Thuringia. Labor day rallies are traditionally orga-
3https://bit.ly/2OAThfv
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nized by left-leaning organizations. The AfD rally was therefore arguably an attempt
to set a counterpoint to left-wing rallies in Germany. As in Berlin, the Erfurt rally fea-
tured prominent AfD politicians and was advertised in regional AfD chapters. The rally
was also part of the AfD’s election campaign for the European elections held on May
26th 2019. The political alliance “Stand Together” (Zusammenstehen) responded to the an-
nouncement of the AfD by organizing a counterrally in Erfurt. Similar to the counterrally
in Berlin, the Erfurt alliance was supported by major national and regional left-leaning
parties, and the main union confederation. The alliance’s mobilization effort focused on
social media and targeted the members of supporting parties and civil society organi-
zations within Thuringia. Roughly 1,000 AfD supporters turned out in total, who were
opposed by about 4,000 activists in the counterraly.
2.3 Sample recruitment
The recruitment of political activists for an experimental intervention is challenging, par-
ticularly on the right end of the political spectrum. We therefore devised a targeted
recruitment strategy using online ads distributed via Facebook. Facebook ads can be
targeted to specific geographies as well as to individuals with particular political pref-
erences, which enabled us to sample hard-to-reach respondents. Specifically, we used
two separate ads: one targeted at potential supporters of the AfD rally and one targeted
at supporters of the counterrally. The ads invited individuals to take part in a scientific
survey regarding rally participation, which was incentivized using Amazon vouchers
(Appendix section F shows screenshots and translations of the ads). To recruit a sample
of likely rally participants, we targeted our ads to individuals that reside within 80 kilo-
meters of Berlin or Erfurt, respectively, and only those residents who expressed interest
in left-wing or right-wing politics in the past.4
4On the right we targeted individuals who, according to Facebook, were interested in the following
terms “Alternative for Germany AfD”, “National Democratic Party of Germany”, or “Right-wing politics.”
On left we targeted the following terms “Anti-Fascist Action”, “Green party”, “Green Youth (Germany)”,
Social Democratic Party of Germany”, “Young Socialists in the SPD”, “The Left (Germany)”, “Left-wing
politics”, or “Anti-racism.” For both groups we used Facebook’s natural extension to also include individ-
uals who did not meet these explicit criteria but are likely to be suitable participants of the survey.
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2.4 Experimental Design
For each rally, we administered an online survey with the same treatment information
to AfD supporters and supporters of left-leaning organizations in order to maximize
comparability. The structure of the experimental manipulation was as follows: first, we
measured respondents’ prior beliefs about the turnout at their own rally and that at their
competitor rally. Second, respondents were then provided with different forecasts about
the turnout at the two rallies (more below). Third, we measured respondents’ intended
rally participation. For an overview of the experimental details, see Table A1.
Pre-treatment characteristics and beliefs Before the experimental manipulation,
we administered four background items on respondents’ location, gender, education,
and age. In addition, we also elicited respondents’ motives to participate in a rally.
Specifically, we measured (i) respondents’ agreement with the statement that they ‘pri-
marily go rallying to ignite political change;’ (ii) respondents’ agreement with the state-
ment that they ‘primarily go rallying to express their views;’ and (iii) respondents’ view
whether they think the AfD is a) ‘an important opportunity for Germany’ (only asked
on the right) or b) ‘a threat to democracy’ (only asked on the left). Thereafter, the survey
inquired about respondents’ beliefs about the turnout at the AfD rally and the counter-
rally.
Information treatment After measuring the pre-treatment covariates and prior be-
liefs, we provided respondents with expert forecasts regarding turnout at their own and
the competitor rally. For both rallies, we randomly provided one of two forecasts (either
high or low) yielding in total four different treatment groups. The specific forecasts are
shown in Table 1. In Berlin, the low turnout forecast for both rallies was 5,000, while the
high estimate was 10,000. In Erfurt, the low forecast was 1,000, while the high estimate
was 3,000.
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Table 1: Treatments
Berlin Erfurt
AfD high, Counter low AfD: 10,000
Counter: 5,000
AfD: 3,000
Counter: 1,000
AfD low, Counter high AfD: 5,000
Counter: 10,000
AfD: 1,000
Counter: 3,000
AfD low, Counter low AfD: 5,000
Counter: 5,000
AfD: 1,000
Counter: 1,000
AfD high, Counter high AfD: 10,000
Counter: 10,000
AfD: 3,000
Counter: 3,000
Notes: Table 1 shows the four treatment conditions administered in Erfurt and Berlin, respec-
tively. The numbers indicate the likely rally turnout, which were based on expert forecasts
provided by the police, organizers, journalists and academics.
Ethical considerations Our intervention did not deceive respondents nor did it pose
any risk to them. All forecasts were realistic, provided by reputable sources5 and broadly
captured actual turnout levels. Respondents were thus accurately informed. The right
to protest is both de jure and de facto protected by authorities in Germany. Both rallies
turned out to be peaceful and no participant was harmed.
Posterior beliefs about turnout and rally participation After providing the treat-
ment information, we administered the main outcomes of interest. First, we elicited
respondents’ posterior beliefs about the turnout at the AfD rally as well as the turnout
at the counterrally. Obtaining the posterior beliefs about rally participation allows us
to verify that our treatment indeed shifted participants’ beliefs. Second, we elicited a
continuous measure of respondents’ willingness to take part in their respective rally
measured on a 4-point scale, ranging from certain non-participation (1) to certain par-
ticipation (4). Based on this measure, we also construct a binary indicator for whether
respondents were certain about participating in their respective rally. We standardize all
5In order to obtain credible estimates of turnout, we contacted several sources familiar with the respec-
tive organizers (both partisan and neutral observers, such as the police) a few days before the survey.
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variables at the rally-city level to make the effects comparable across contexts.6
2.5 Descriptives and integrity of randomization
Summary Statistics Table A2 provides summary statistics for the pooled sample.
Overall, we were able to recruit 1,464 respondents among both right- and left-wing ac-
tivists. 71 percent of respondents are male, their average age is 44 years. On average,
respondents participated in five previous rallies, suggesting that we recruited a set of
politically active respondents. Tables A3 and A4 provide the summary statistics for the
AfD and counteractivist sample separately. The AfD-sample includes 75 percent men
compared to 64 percent in the left-leaning sample. The average age among AfD support-
ers is 49 years compared to 37 years in the left-wing counteractivist sample. 51 percent
of AfD-supporters have completed university education, while this number is 49 percent
in the left-wing counteractivist sample. On average, 41 percent of AfD-supporters plan
to attend the rally, compared to 24 percent in the left-wing counteractivist sample.
Importantly, random assignment to treatment created excellent balance both in the
pooled sample (Tables A7) as well as in the subsample of potential AfD supporters (Table
A8) and supporters of the left-leaning organizations (Table A9).
3 Results
3.1 Correlates of rally participation
Before analyzing the experimental data, we explore the correlation of beliefs about rally
turnout with intended rally participation. Panel A in Table 2 presents data for supporters
of the left-wing counterrally, while Panel B presents data for supporters of the AfD rally.
For supporters on both sides of the spectrum, prior beliefs about the size of the own rally
positively predict respondents’ intention to rally. By contrast, beliefs about the size of the
competitor rally are negatively correlated with rally participation intentions. However,
6While not pre-specified, this is a necessary step to make the size of treatment effects comparable across
different contexts. Results are robust to not standardizing the outcome variables (Appendix Table A13).
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the association of beliefs about turnout and intended rally participation are likely con-
founded because of reverse causality and omitted variable bias. For instance, protesters
may hold motivated beliefs and might thus downplay the size of the competitor rally,
while exaggerating the size of the own rally. To circumvent these concerns our study
uses experimental variation in beliefs, which is discussed in the next subsection.
Table 2: Correlation between turnout beliefs and participation intentions
Intention Intention
Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Prior: own (z) 0.285∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.045)
Prior: other (z) -0.322∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.039)
Observations 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Prior: own (z) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.037)
Prior: other (z) -0.104∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036)
Observations 897 897
Notes: Table 2 presents the correlates of rally participation. Panel A shows data from supporters
of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from supporters of the AfD rally. “Attend (z)” are stan-
dardized intentions to participate in the rally reported on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain
but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes (z)” is a standardized dummy vari-
able that indicates answering yes to the same question. “Prior: own (z)” is respondents’ z-scored
pre-treatment belief about the size of their own rally. “Prior: other (z)” is respondents’ z-scored
pre-treatment belief about the size of the opposing rally.
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3.2 Main experimental estimates
To estimate the impact of own and competitor rally turnout on participation intentions,
we estimate the following equation:
yi = α0 + α1own highi + α2competitor highi + Xi + ε i (1)
where yi is respondent i’s intention to participate in the rally. own highi takes the value
1 if respondent i received the higher expert forecast for her own rally, and zero if she
received the lower forecast. competitor highi takes the value 1 if i received the higher ex-
pert forecast about competitor turnout, and zero if she received the lower forecast.7 Xi
is a vector of all available pre-determined control variables. It includes age, gender, a
dummy for university education, a dummy if the respondent answered the left-wing-
survey, a dummy for living near the city of the rally, a dummy indicating whether the
rally took place in Berlin, a dummy for previous rally experience, a measure of percep-
tions about the AfD, a measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies, and a measure
of whether the respondent mainly participates in rallies to express her opinion. In our
main analysis, we pool data across both rallies, but separately analyze AfD-activists and
counteractivists. We restrict our sample to individuals that could clearly be assigned as
either a potential AfD activist or a potential counteractivist.
Post-treatment beliefs about turnout We first qualify our information treatment
by investigating whether the treatment changed respondents’ beliefs about the turnout
of their own as well as the competitor’s rally. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 demonstrate
that respondents’ posterior beliefs are strongly and significantly affected by the expert
forecasts. Among supporters of the counterrally, receiving a high forecast about the own
rally increases beliefs about its size by 0.41 standard deviations relative to receiving a low
forecast, while receiving a high forecast about the opposing rally increases beliefs about
7An alternative way of analyzing the data involves the inclusion of an interaction term between receiv-
ing a high forecast for the own rally and a high forecast for the competitor rally. Table A10 shows that there
are no significant interaction effects. To increase statistical power for the main effects of interest, we do not
include the interaction term in our main specification.
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its size by 0.37 standard deviations relative to receiving a low forecast. We find a similar
pattern on the political right: AfD supporters who receive a high forecast about their
own rally increase their beliefs about its size by 0.16 standard deviations, while those
who receive a high forecast about the opposing rally increase their beliefs about its size
by 0.27 standard deviations.
Figure 1 shows differential belief updating for respondents who received a high or
a low forecast for different segments of the prior belief distribution. We observe that
respondents who received the high forecast in all but one case update more positively
than respondents receiving the low forecast. This suggests that the treatment effects
observed in Table 3 are not driven by respondents with specific prior beliefs about protest
turnout.
Table 3 also shows little evidence of cross-learning: participants do not update their
beliefs about the size of the opposing rally when receiving forecasts about the size of their
own rally, and vice versa. In sum, our evidence highlights that the provision of expert
forecasts significantly changed respondents’ beliefs about the respective rally sizes.
Competitor turnout and rally participation Did the treatment change respondents’
intention to participate in the rally? We begin by analyzing how respondents’ intended
participation responds to receiving a forecast about high competitor turnout. Canonical
theories of political contests predict that rally participation should increase in the per-
ceived size of the competitor rally. At the same time, an activist’s enjoyment value of
attending a rally may decrease in competitor turnout because she may prefer to be part
of the bigger movement. Table 3 shows small and statistically insignificant increases in
intended rally participation of 0.08 standard deviations for potential supporters of the
counterrally, and of approximately 0.04 standard deviations for potential supporters of
the right-wing rally. Taken together, we thus find no significant increases in rally partici-
pation in response to perceived increases in competitor rally size. Importantly, the small
coefficients are highly similar across both groups of the political spectrum.
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Figure 1: Belief updating
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Notes: Figure 1 plots the mean difference between standardized posterior and prior beliefs about rally atten-
dance in different treatment groups against prior beliefs. Updating is plotted for three groups: respondents
whose prior belief is below both the low and high forecast, respondents whose prior belief is between the
low and high forecast, and respondents whose prior belief is above the low and the high forecast. Vertical
bars represent two standard error intervals around the mean. Panel a) plots belief updating about turnout
at a respondent’s own rally. Panel b) plots belief updating about turnout at a respondent’s opposing rally.
“Own high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero if
they received the low forecast. “Other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the
opposing group, and value zero if they received the low forecast.
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Own movement turnout and rally participation Next, we investigate whether in-
tentions to rally depend on the perception of the turnout of the own political camp. In
this context, our setting furthermore allows us to study whether the nature of political
coordination games differs between political movements. Standard models of collective
action predict that rally turnout is a public goods game with incentives to free-ride (Ol-
son, 1965). Activists should thus reduce their effort when fellow activists contribute more
to the public good. Put differently, effort choices of activists are strategic substitutes. At
the same time, the non-instrumental benefits from participating in a rally could increase
when more fellow activists turn out as activists enjoy being surrounded by like-minded
individuals. The cost of participation (e.g., being recognized by bystanders) could also
be lower when the own rally is larger. Following these channels, one might expect strate-
gic complementarity of effort choices within the same political movement (Barbera and
Jackson, 2020; Edmond, 2013).
Table 3 shows that both left- and right-wing activists are highly responsive to the
turnout of the own political camp. Importantly, however, the patterns of strategic inter-
actions vary substantially between the left-leaning countermovement and the right-wing
movement. For supporters of the left-wing counterrally own effort choices and those of
peers are strategic complements. When left-wing respondents receive a forecast about
higher turnout of the own rally, they increase their participation intentions by 0.17 stan-
dard deviations. By contrast, for right-wing respondents own effort choices and those of
peers are strategic substitutes. When an AfD supporter receives a forecast about higher
peer turnout, she decreases her participation intentions by 0.15 standard deviations. The
effect size differences are highly statistically significant (p < 0.01). We obtain similar re-
sults when using a dummy for certain participation as dependent variable. This evidence
highlights substantial differences in the strategic considerations by followers of different
political movements. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that activists on
the left exhibit stronger social motives, while activists on the right place more weight on
instrumental motives, inducing free-rider behavior.
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Table 3: Main experimental results
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 0.408∗∗∗ 0.036 0.172∗∗ 0.138∗
(0.084) (0.083) (0.078) (0.083)
Other high 0.113 0.370∗∗∗ 0.076 0.094
(0.084) (0.084) (0.078) (0.083)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high 0.159∗∗ -0.047 -0.147∗∗ -0.125∗∗
(0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.062)
Other high 0.013 0.275∗∗∗ 0.039 0.065
(0.068) (0.069) (0.062) (0.062)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Own high 0.02 0.43 0.00 0.01
Other high 0.35 0.38 0.70 0.78
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from support-
ers of the AfD rally. “Attend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported
on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes
(z)” is a standardized dummy variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. “Own
high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero
if they received the low forecast. “Other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high
forecast for the opposing group, and value zero if they received the low forecast. We control for
age, gender, whether an individual completed university education, whether the respondent an-
swered the survey targeted at the left, a dummy for living in the city of the rally, a dummy for the
city in which the rally took place, previous rally experience, a measure of perception of the AfD, a
measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people mainly rally
to express their opinion.
Perceptions of the relative size of rallies An alternative way of analyzing the ex-
perimental data involves studying how relative rally sizes affect rally participation. In
this regard, we estimate the following equation:
yi = α0 + α1Differencei + Xi + ε i (2)
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where Differencei takes value -1 if the expert forecast predicts that the own rally is smaller
than the competing rally, value 0 if the own rally and competing rally are forecasted to
be of equal size, and value 1 if the own rally is forecasted to be larger than the com-
peting rally. In line with the results from the previous section, Table 4 shows that for
AfD supporters intended participation is lower if the expert forecast indicates that the
AfD rally will be larger than the competitor rally. By contrast, intended participation in-
creases when the expert forecasts indicate that the opposing rally will be bigger. This is
in line with AfD supporters exhibiting instrumental motives. For left-wing activists, we
observe no significant effect of the difference in forecasts. The null finding supports the
reading that left-leaning activists are predominantly motivated by social motives within
the own political group, as opposed to instrumental considerations.
3.3 Explaining the heterogeneity
Can the heterogeneity across movements be explained by differences in observable char-
acteristics of the supporters? In Table A11 we interact ownhigh and competitorhigh with
all pre-specified control variables. We find that the difference in the effect of ownhigh
remains statistically significant, even when all other interaction terms are included.
Why then do we observe marked heterogeneity across left- and right-leaning respon-
dents? In this section, we discuss three plausible channels. To adjudicate between the
channels, we conducted an additional survey 7 weeks after the Erfurt rally in which
we gathered a rich set of covariates for supporters of the AfD rally and the left-wing
counterrally. In an effort to keep this new sample as comparable as possible to the two
experimental samples, we recruited potential activists using the same Facebook ads and
recruitment procedure described in section 2.3. In terms of attitudes and demographics,
the sample appears highly similar to the experimental samples (Table A5).
Social motives Influential theories of collective action problems posit that stronger
social motives may lead to conditional cooperation (Ostrom, 2000). If such motives dom-
inate instrumental concerns, activists increase their effort in response to an increase in the
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Table 4: Main results: difference in forecast
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Difference 0.148∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ 0.048 0.022
(0.054) (0.054) (0.049) (0.052)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Difference 0.073∗ -0.161∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗ -0.095∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Difference 0.33 0.91 0.13 0.23
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from support-
ers of the AfD rally. Difference takes value -1 if the own rally is predicted to be smaller than the
competing rally, takes value 0 if the own rally and competing rally are predicted to be of equal
size and takes value 1 if the own rally is predicted to be larger than the competing rally. “Attend
(z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3,
uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes (z)” is a standardized dummy
variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. We control for age, gender, whether
an individual completed university education, whether the respondent answered the survey tar-
geted at the left, a dummy for living in Berlin, previous rally experience, a measure of perception
of the AfD, a measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people
mainly participate in rallies to express their opinion.
perceived size of the own rally.8 Recent results by Hager et al. (2019) suggest that activists
with stronger social motives are indeed less likely to exhibit strategic substitutability.
Similarly, Bursztyn et al. (2020) provide evidence from the Hongkong protest movement
that having stronger friendship networks increases sustained political engagement. In
our context, one key distinguishing feature between supporters of the AfD and support-
ers of the left-wing organizations could thus be the tightness of their social network. This
in turn could explain why left-leaning respondents are more likely to show a pattern of
8In Appendix Section D we develop a theoretical framework that attributes these differences to differ-
ences in the importance of social and instrumental motives.
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strategic complementarity.
To explore whether activists from the left and right differ in terms of the number
of protesters they know, we collected a set of covariates in the aforementioned second
survey. Table A6 shows that supporters of the left-wing rally know substantially more
people who previously participated in rallies compared to supporters of the right-wing
rally (p = 0.057). In turn, this may imply that people from the left have stronger social
motives for participating in the rally and that conditional cooperation motives are higher.
Table A6 also showcases that activists on the left have attended more rallies in the past,
which again is consistent with the idea that left-wing activists are more closely connected
to their peers.
Differences in enjoyment value Do activists from the left and the right differ in
terms of their perceived enjoyment value of rallies? Table A6 demonstrates that left-wing
activists are significantly more likely to agree to the statement that they enjoy taking part
in rallies (p = 0.002). In turn, free-rider motives may be less pronounced among left-
wing activists given that they receive a higher private consumption value from partici-
pating in political rallies. Left-wing respondents may thus place a higher relative weight
on the enjoyment value of rallies compared to the instrumental benefits associated with
rally participation.
Differences in preferences and beliefs Given the pronounced effect of preferences
on political behavior, an alternative account for the differential response among respon-
dents from the left and the right might be differences in preferences. Importantly, Table
A6 shows that there are no significant differences in risk preferences (p = 0.272) and
preferences for competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) (p = 0.805) across people
from the left and the right. This in turn suggests that differences in preferences are less
likely to drive differences in responses to the information. Finally, one other potential ex-
planation for our heterogenous effects may be differences in the perceived effectiveness
of rallies for igniting political change. However, our data suggest that activists on the left
and the right do not differ significantly in terms of their beliefs about the effectiveness of
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rallies (p = 0.282).
Rally versus counterrally A final alternative explanation for the patterns of hetero-
geneity could be that strategic interactions fundamentally differ between movements
and reactionary countermovements rather than the political left and the right. We find
that the initiating movement (the right-wing movement) exhibits substitutability while
the reacting countermovement (the left-wing movement) displays complementarity. A
potential theoretical account for this pattern might be that activists of an initiating move-
ment generally possess stronger instrumental motives. These activists are concerned
with the goal of changing conditions relative to the status-quo and therefore might be
more concerned with the resulting outcome of their activism.
3.4 Robustness
Behavioral outcome In addition to the survey outcome, we also attempted to collect
a behavioral outcome measure, namely respondents’ willingness to provide the research
team with their email address and send a photo from their participation in the rally.
Specifically, respondents were informed that if they sent a photo to the research team,
they would have the chance to win an Amazon voucher worth 50 Euros. Unfortunately,
only a very small subset of respondents sent a photo for the rally in Berlin (3 percent of
the sample, on average), while no photo was sent in the context of the rallies in Erfurt.
One reason for the low number of pictures are privacy concerns, given that respondents
were required to share their email address with the research team.
Still, we find broadly consistent patterns of treatment effects on behavior with respect
to activists’ own rally. Tables A15 and A16 show that for potential counteractivists we
find large increases in the probability of sending the photo in response to learning that
the own rally is larger and in response to learning that the competitor rally is larger.
For respondents from the right-wing rally we find that the probability of sending in the
photo decreases when the own rally is expected to be large, consistent with the treat-
ment effects on self-reported intentions. The effect of learning that the competitor rally
is larger decreases the likelihood of sending the photo, inconsistent with the direction of
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the treatment effect on intentions.
Experimenter demand effects A concern regarding our evidence might be that in-
tended participation is self-reported. Estimated treatment effects may thus be confounded
by experimenter demand effects. We believe that demand effects are unlikely for three
reasons. First, recent evidence suggests that participants in online experiments respond
only very moderately to explicit signals of experimenter expectations (de Quidt et al.,
2018; Mummolo and Peterson, 2019). Second, it is not obivous how information about
competitor and fellow activists’ turnout should affect respondents, making it less likely
that the experimental hypothesis is transparent. Moreover, the heterogeneous responses
by whether activists are supporters of the right-wing rally or the counterrally are in-
consistent with demand effects unless supporters from the right and from the left infer
different experimenter demand from identical instructions. Third, we find qualitatively
consistent treatment effects for the behavioral outcome, which is less likely to be con-
founded by demand effects.
4 Conclusion
We study strategic interactions in movements and countermovements. We experimen-
tally manipulate beliefs about turnout at right-wing rallies and left-wing counterrallies
among supporters of both rallies. Our evidence provides three key results. First, for
both supporters of the right- and left-wing rallies, responses to the perceived size of their
competitor rally are muted and insignificant. However, intended participation is respon-
sive with respect to turnout within the own political camp. Our second result shows that
turnout of right-wing activists and their peers exhibit strategic substitutability. Third,
and by contrast, supporters of the counterrally and those of peers exhibit complementar-
ity in their intention to participate.
Our evidence has implications for our understanding of the dynamics of political
movements. First, activists seem not to be responsive to activism in the competitor group.
This result helps understand how small fringe movements can obtain systematic power
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when not being met by countermovements from the opposite side of the political spec-
trum. Second, across different types of movements, there is substantial heterogeneity
in the patterns of strategic interactions within the own political group. Across different
settings of political activism, existing evidence in the literature has found contradictory
patterns of substitutability (Cantoni et al., 2019; Hager et al., 2020) or complementarity
(Bursztyn et al., 2020; González, 2020). We present within the same setting different pat-
terns of strategic interactions across different political movements. Hence, our findings
underscore that patterns of strategic interaction in political activism cannot be assumed
to be universal. Rather, they might differ fundamentally across political groups with
different motives.
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Online Appendix
Online Appendix Section A contains additional figures. Online Appendix Section B con-
tains additional tables. Online Appendix Section C describes deviations from the pre-
analysis plan. Online Appendix Section D provides supplementary proofs and deriva-
tions. Online Appendix Section E provides the survey instrument, followed by Online
Appendix Section F providing the invitation email.
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A Additional figures
Figure A1: Prior beliefs in Berlin
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Notes: This figure plots the prior beliefs about rally attendance in Berlin by political affilia-
tion. Panels a) and b) plot prior beliefs about attendance at respondents’ own rally for the
AfD and counterrally, respectively. Panels c) and d) prior beliefs about attendance at the
opposing rally for the AfD and counterrally, respectively.
26
Figure A2: Prior beliefs in Erfurt
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Notes: This figure plots the prior beliefs about rally attendance in Erfurt by political affilia-
tion. Panels a) and b) plot prior beliefs about attendance at respondents’ own rally for the
AfD and counterrally, respectively. Panels c) and d) prior beliefs about attendance at the
opposing rally for the AfD and counterrally, respectively.
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Figure A3: Treatment
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Notes: This figure plots the estimated treatment effects for the supporters of both the AfD
rally and the left-wing counterrally. “Attend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate
in the rally reported on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but
probably not; 1, no). “Yes (z)” is a standardized dummy variable that indicates answering
yes to the same question. The coefficients of “own high” are plotted in panel a) and the
coefficients of “other high” are plotted in panel b). “own high” takes value 1 if respondents
received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero if they received the low fore-
cast. “other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the opposing
group, and value zero if they received the low forecast. We control for age, gender, whether
an individual completed university education, whether the respondent answered the sur-
vey targeted at the left, a dummy for living in the city of the rally, a dummy for the city in
which the rally took place, previous rally experience, a measure of perception of the AfD, a
measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people main
participate in rallies to express their opinion.
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Figure A4: Example screens of treatment: Berlin
Figure A5: Example screens of treatment: Erfurt
Notes: Figure A4 shows two example treatment screens for the experiments conducted in
Berlin. Figure A5 shows two example treatment screens for the experiments conducted in
Erfurt.
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B Additional tables
Table A1: Overview of experiments
Experiment Sample Treatments Arms Main outcomes
Experiment
1 (May
2018)
Facebook
advertise-
ment and
email lists
(N=959)
Treatment 1: Expected own rally size: 10000;
Expected competitor rally size: 10000
Treatment 2: Expected own rally size: 5000;
Expected competitor rally size: 10000
Treatment 3: Expected own rally size: 10000;
Expected competitor rally size: 5000
Treatment 4: Expected own rally size: 5000;
Expected competitor rally size: 5000
Intended rally
participation;
post-treatment
beliefs about rally
sizes
Experiment
2
(April/May
2019)
Facebook
advertise-
ment (N =
505)
Treatment 1: Expected own rally size: 3000;
Expected competitor rally size: 3000
Treatment 2: Expected own rally size: 1000;
Expected competitor rally size: 3000
Treatment 3: Expected own rally size: 3000;
Expected competitor rally size: 1000
Treatment 4: Expected own rally size: 1000;
Expected competitor rally size: 1000
Intended rally
participation;
post-treatment
beliefs about rally
sizes
Experiment
3 (June
2019)
Facebook
adver-
tisement
(N=337)
No treatment administration Rich set of co-
variates on social
motives, enjoy-
ment value, and
preferences
Notes: This table provides an overview of the different experiments conducted.
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Table A2: Summary statistics: full sample
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Pooled sample
Male 0.71 0.45 1.00 0 1 1464
Age 44.11 15.57 45.50 0 99 1464
High education 0.50 0.50 1.00 0 1 1464
Previous protest participation 5.29 3.92 5.00 0 10 1464
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.75 1.35 4.00 0 5 1464
Go to protest to express my view 2.80 1.37 3.00 0 5 1464
AfD perception 4.15 1.44 5.00 0 5 1464
Prior: left-wing protest 6527.81 7246.51 4000.00 0 30000 1464
Prior: right-wing protest 6457.31 6940.14 5000.00 0 30000 1464
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.58 0.49 1.00 0 1 1464
Social Democratic Party 0.05 0.21 0.00 0 1 1464
Christian Democratic Union 0.03 0.18 0.00 0 1 1464
The Left 0.15 0.36 0.00 0 1 1464
Greens 0.08 0.26 0.00 0 1 1464
None 0.05 0.22 0.00 0 1 1464
Other 0.06 0.25 0.00 0 1 1464
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 6637.57 6516.29 5000.00 0 30000 1464
Posterior: left-wing Protest 6239.21 6402.35 5000.00 0 30000 1464
Certain to go protesting 0.34 0.48 0.00 0 1 1464
Intention to go protesting 2.49 1.29 3.00 1 4 1464
Panel B: Berlin protest
Male 0.67 0.47 1.00 0 1 959
Age 43.72 15.71 45.00 0 99 959
High education 0.65 0.48 1.00 0 1 959
Previous protest participation 5.44 3.89 5.00 0 10 959
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.74 1.37 4.00 0 5 959
Go to protest to express my view 2.81 1.39 3.00 0 5 959
AfD perception 4.05 1.51 5.00 0 5 959
Prior: left-wing protest 9066.74 7740.83 7000.00 0 30000 959
Prior: right-wing protest 8567.26 7672.13 6000.00 0 30000 959
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.51 0.50 1.00 0 1 959
Social Democratic Party 0.05 0.22 0.00 0 1 959
Christian Democratic Union 0.03 0.18 0.00 0 1 959
The Left 0.16 0.36 0.00 0 1 959
Greens 0.09 0.28 0.00 0 1 959
None 0.08 0.26 0.00 0 1 959
Other 0.08 0.27 0.00 0 1 959
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 8803.96 7049.57 7000.00 0 30000 959
Posterior: left-wing Protest 8633.99 6688.45 7000.00 0 30000 959
Certain to go protesting 0.38 0.48 0.00 0 1 959
Intention to go protesting 2.63 1.27 3.00 1 4 959
Provided e-mail address 0.18 0.39 0.00 0 1 959
Panel C: Erfurt protest
Male 0.78 0.42 1.00 0 1 505
Age 44.87 15.27 46.00 16 95 505
High education 0.21 0.41 0.00 0 1 505
Previous protest participation 5.00 3.97 5.00 0 10 505
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.78 1.31 4.00 1 5 505
Go to protest to express my view 2.79 1.33 3.00 1 5 505
AfD perception 4.34 1.27 5.00 1 5 505
Prior: left-wing protest 1706.36 1725.19 1000.00 0 5000 505
Prior: right-wing protest 2450.49 1836.49 2000.00 0 5000 505
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.70 0.46 1.00 0 1 505
Social Democratic Party 0.04 0.19 0.00 0 1 505
Christian Democratic Union 0.03 0.16 0.00 0 1 505
The Left 0.13 0.34 0.00 0 1 505
Greens 0.06 0.23 0.00 0 1 505
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 505
Other 0.04 0.20 0.00 0 1 505
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 2523.56 1704.79 2000.00 0 5000 505
Posterior: left-wing Protest 1691.48 1522.21 1000.00 0 5000 505
Certain to go protesting 0.29 0.45 0.00 0 1 505
Intention to go protesting 2.24 1.29 2.00 1 4 505
Entered foto competition 0.04 0.19 0.00 0 1 505
Notes: This Table provides summary statistics for both the sample of potential sup-
porters of the AfD rally and the counterrally.
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Table A3: Summary statistics: AfD sample
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Pooled sample
Male 0.75 0.43 1.00 0 1 897
Age 48.67 13.86 50.00 0 99 897
High education 0.51 0.50 1.00 0 1 897
Previous protest participation 4.77 3.85 4.00 0 10 897
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.91 1.38 4.00 0 5 897
Go to protest to express my view 2.74 1.43 3.00 0 5 897
AfD perception 4.46 1.22 5.00 0 5 897
Prior: left-wing protest 4972.31 6415.41 2000.00 0 30000 897
Prior: right-wing protest 7496.55 7553.46 5000.00 0 30000 897
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.95 0.23 1.00 0 1 897
Social Democratic Party 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 897
Christian Democratic Union 0.01 0.10 0.00 0 1 897
The Left 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 897
Greens 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 897
None 0.02 0.14 0.00 0 1 897
Other 0.02 0.14 0.00 0 1 897
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 7515.66 7127.41 5000.00 0 30000 897
Posterior: left-wing Protest 4910.28 5726.27 3000.00 0 30000 897
Certain to go protesting 0.41 0.49 0.00 0 1 897
Intention to go protesting 2.67 1.30 3.00 1 4 897
Panel B: Berlin protest
Male 0.72 0.45 1.00 0 1 542
Age 48.76 13.85 50.00 0 99 542
High education 0.71 0.45 1.00 0 1 542
Previous protest participation 4.72 3.78 4.00 0 10 542
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.94 1.39 5.00 0 5 542
Go to protest to express my view 2.73 1.47 3.00 0 5 542
AfD perception 4.39 1.32 5.00 0 5 542
Prior: left-wing protest 7309.96 7258.36 5000.00 0 30000 542
Prior: right-wing protest 10619.93 8219.69 9000.00 0 30000 542
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.91 0.29 1.00 0 1 542
Social Democratic Party 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 542
Christian Democratic Union 0.02 0.13 0.00 0 1 542
The Left 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 542
Greens 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 542
None 0.04 0.18 0.00 0 1 542
Other 0.04 0.18 0.00 0 1 542
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 10571.96 7650.97 9000.00 0 30000 542
Posterior: left-wing Protest 7186.35 6313.17 5000.00 0 30000 542
Certain to go protesting 0.46 0.50 0.00 0 1 542
Intention to go protesting 2.84 1.25 3.00 1 4 542
Provided e-mail address 0.16 0.37 0.00 0 1 542
Panel C: Erfurt protest
Male 0.79 0.40 1.00 0 1 355
Age 48.52 13.89 50.00 18 95 355
High education 0.19 0.39 0.00 0 1 355
Previous protest participation 4.85 3.95 4.00 0 10 355
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.85 1.36 4.00 1 5 355
Go to protest to express my view 2.77 1.38 3.00 1 5 355
AfD perception 4.56 1.05 5.00 1 5 355
Prior: left-wing protest 1403.26 1586.83 900.00 0 5000 355
Prior: right-wing protest 2727.89 1848.18 2500.00 0 5000 355
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1 1 355
Social Democratic Party 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
Christian Democratic Union 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
The Left 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
Greens 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 355
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 2849.43 1726.82 2500.00 0 5000 355
Posterior: left-wing Protest 1435.27 1429.18 1000.00 0 5000 355
Certain to go protesting 0.34 0.48 0.00 0 1 355
Intention to go protesting 2.42 1.32 2.00 1 4 355
Entered foto competition 0.04 0.19 0.00 0 1 355
Notes: This Table provides summary statistics for the sample of potential supporters
of the AfD rally.
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Table A4: Summary statistics: counterrally sample
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Pooled sample
Male 0.64 0.48 1.00 0 1 567
Age 36.91 15.41 34.00 0 99 567
High education 0.49 0.50 0.00 0 1 567
Previous protest participation 6.11 3.91 6.00 0 10 567
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.50 1.26 4.00 0 5 567
Go to protest to express my view 2.89 1.26 3.00 0 5 567
AfD perception 3.67 1.62 5.00 0 5 567
Prior: left-wing protest 8988.63 7789.63 7000.00 0 30000 567
Prior: right-wing protest 4813.22 5455.20 3000.00 0 30000 567
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 567
Social Democratic Party 0.12 0.33 0.00 0 1 567
Christian Democratic Union 0.07 0.25 0.00 0 1 567
The Left 0.38 0.49 0.00 0 1 567
Greens 0.19 0.40 0.00 0 1 567
None 0.09 0.29 0.00 0 1 567
Other 0.13 0.34 0.00 0 1 567
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 5248.42 5116.90 4000.00 0 30000 567
Posterior: left-wing Protest 8341.58 6842.28 7000.00 0 30000 567
Certain to go protesting 0.24 0.43 0.00 0 1 567
Intention to go protesting 2.21 1.24 2.00 1 4 567
Panel B: Berlin protest
Male 0.61 0.49 1.00 0 1 417
Age 37.15 15.58 34.00 0 99 417
High education 0.58 0.49 1.00 0 1 417
Previous protest participation 6.37 3.84 7.00 0 10 417
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.47 1.29 4.00 0 5 417
Go to protest to express my view 2.91 1.28 3.00 0 5 417
AfD perception 3.62 1.63 4.00 0 5 417
Prior: left-wing protest 11350.12 7760.68 10000.00 0 30000 417
Prior: right-wing protest 5899.28 5921.31 4000.00 0 30000 417
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 417
Social Democratic Party 0.12 0.33 0.00 0 1 417
Christian Democratic Union 0.06 0.23 0.00 0 1 417
The Left 0.36 0.48 0.00 0 1 417
Greens 0.20 0.40 0.00 0 1 417
None 0.13 0.33 0.00 0 1 417
Other 0.13 0.34 0.00 0 1 417
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 6506.00 5380.75 5000.00 0 30000 417
Posterior: left-wing Protest 10515.59 6701.42 10000.00 0 30000 417
Certain to go protesting 0.27 0.44 0.00 0 1 417
Intention to go protesting 2.35 1.25 2.00 1 4 417
Provided e-mail address 0.21 0.41 0.00 0 1 417
Panel C: Erfurt protest
Male 0.73 0.44 1.00 0 1 150
Age 36.22 14.93 33.50 16 72 150
High education 0.25 0.44 0.00 0 1 150
Previous protest participation 5.36 4.00 5.00 0 10 150
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.59 1.16 4.00 1 5 150
Go to protest to express my view 2.83 1.21 3.00 1 5 150
AfD perception 3.81 1.58 5.00 1 5 150
Prior: left-wing protest 2423.71 1829.78 1800.00 0 5000 150
Prior: right-wing protest 1793.96 1635.75 1000.00 0 5000 150
Party affiliation
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 150
Social Democratic Party 0.13 0.33 0.00 0 1 150
Christian Democratic Union 0.09 0.29 0.00 0 1 150
The Left 0.45 0.50 0.00 0 1 150
Greens 0.19 0.39 0.00 0 1 150
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0 0 150
Other 0.15 0.35 0.00 0 1 150
Outcomes
Posterior: right-wing Protest 1752.35 1376.39 1000.50 0 5000 150
Posterior: left-wing Protest 2297.85 1567.95 2000.00 0 5000 150
Certain to go protesting 0.15 0.35 0.00 0 1 150
Intention to go protesting 1.83 1.14 1.00 1 4 150
Entered foto competition 0.03 0.18 0.00 0 1 150
Notes: This Table provides summary statistics for the sample of potential supporters
of the counterrally.
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Table A5: Demographics summary statistics: descriptive sample
Mean SD Median Min. Max. Obs.
Panel A: Left-wing sample
Male 0.71 0.46 1.00 0 1 128
Age 44.50 16.83 45.00 18 112 128
High education 0.39 0.49 0.00 0 1 128
Previous protest participation 6.02 4.02 5.50 0 10 128
Protests are effective at igniting political change 3.79 1.25 4.00 1 5 128
Going to the protest to express my view 2.72 1.26 3.00 1 5 128
AfD perception 3.82 1.55 5.00 1 5 128
Panel B: Right-wing sample
Male 0.75 0.44 1.00 0 1 209
Age 50.25 13.80 53.00 19 88 209
High education 0.25 0.43 0.00 0 1 209
Previous protest participation 5.22 3.98 5.00 0 10 209
Protests are effective at igniting political change 3.63 1.48 4.00 1 5 209
Going to the protest to express my view 2.84 1.49 3.00 1 5 209
AfD perception 4.51 1.09 5.00 1 5 209
Notes: This Table provides summary statistics for the sample recruited seven weeks
after the Erfurt rally.
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Table A6: Additional descriptives on differences in social motives, enjoyment value and
preferences
Right-wing Left-wing P-value of t-test
Degree of competitiveness 4.66 4.59 0.805
Risk-seeking 5.41 5.12 0.272
Number of friends who attended protests 14.22 15.88 0.508
Number of people known who attended protests 25.99 33.83 0.057
Visibility of attendance 3.07 3.04 0.853
Number of protests attended 13.52 19.81 0.040
Perceived effectiveness 3.63 3.79 0.282
Perceives protests as fun 2.56 2.97 0.002
Observations 209 128
Notes: This Table provides evidence on differences in social motives, enjoyment value and prefer-
ences.
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Table A7: Balance tests: pooled sample
low-low high-low low-high high-high P-value - joint test
Male 0.69 0.74 0.70 0.71 0.217
Age 44.91 44.37 43.39 44.06 0.812
High education 0.47 0.47 0.51 0.53 0.287
Previous protest participation 5.05 5.24 5.30 5.48 0.889
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.76 3.82 3.72 3.73 0.349
Go to protest to express my view 2.83 2.79 2.76 2.83 0.837
AfD perception 4.15 4.27 4.04 4.19 0.115
Prior: left-wing protest 5996.98 6040.37 7004.59 6770.48 0.251
Prior: right-wing protest 6629.57 6272.59 6281.52 6621.24 0.597
Alternative for Germany (AfD) 0.60 0.62 0.54 0.58 0.189
Social Democratic Party 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.126
Christian Democratic Union 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.391
The Left 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.494
Greens 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.459
None 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.904
Other 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.942
F-stat 0.735 0.913 1.042 1.449
p(F) 0.760 0.554 0.408 0.111
Notes: This Table provides balance tests for both the sample of potential supporters of the
AfD rally and the counterrally.
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Table A8: Balance tests: AfD sample
low-low high-low low-high high-high P-value - joint test
Male 0.72 0.79 0.72 0.76 0.129
Age 49.13 49.17 47.78 48.80 0.612
High education 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.142
Previous protest participation 4.39 4.74 4.66 5.18 0.987
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.92 3.97 3.89 3.88 0.528
Go to protest to express my view 2.85 2.76 2.69 2.70 0.903
AfD perception 4.46 4.53 4.39 4.46 0.324
Prior: left-wing protest 5191.82 4178.57 5300.84 5038.14 0.040
Prior: right-wing protest 7720.54 7059.99 7439.02 7673.06 0.362
F-stat 0.628 0.581 0.863 0.909
p(F) 0.774 0.813 0.558 0.516
Notes: This Table provides balance tests for the sample of potential supporters of the AfD
rally.
37
Table A9: Balance tests: counterrally sample
low-low high-low low-high high-high P-value - joint test
Male 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.61 0.991
Age 37.87 35.82 37.39 36.34 0.423
High education 0.43 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.856
Previous protest participation 6.15 6.14 6.17 5.98 0.929
Protest are effective at igniting political change 3.49 3.55 3.49 3.49 0.629
Go to protest to express my view 2.80 2.83 2.84 3.04 0.654
AfD perception 3.63 3.80 3.57 3.73 0.368
Prior: left-wing protest 7341.15 9358.42 9333.06 9594.71 0.511
Prior: right-wing protest 4808.26 4869.31 4699.61 4906.45 0.917
Social Democratic Party 0.11 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.058
Christian Democratic Union 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.952
The Left 0.39 0.38 0.41 0.36 0.887
Greens 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.28 0.672
None 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.342
Other 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.143
F-stat 1.323 0.752 1.272 1.137
p(F) 0.183 0.731 0.215 0.319
Notes: This Table provides balance tests for the sample of potential supporters of the coun-
terrally.
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B.1 Robustness
Table A10: Main results including interaction terms
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 0.374∗∗∗ -0.037 0.111 0.109
(0.118) (0.106) (0.106) (0.111)
Other high 0.079 0.299∗∗∗ 0.018 0.066
(0.116) (0.115) (0.103) (0.106)
Own high × other high 0.072 0.151 0.125 0.059
(0.172) (0.171) (0.156) (0.168)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high 0.087 -0.193∗∗ -0.184∗∗ -0.173∗∗
(0.097) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087)
Other high -0.062 0.123 -0.000 0.015
(0.098) (0.100) (0.087) (0.089)
Own high × other high 0.152 0.307∗∗ 0.080 0.102
(0.136) (0.139) (0.123) (0.124)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Own high 0.06 0.25 0.03 0.04
Other high 0.35 0.25 0.89 0.71
Own high × other high 0.71 0.47 0.82 0.84
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from supporters of
the AfD rally. “Attend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported on a four point
scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes (z)” is a standardized
dummy variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. “Own high” takes value 1 if re-
spondents received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero if they received the low forecast.
“Other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the opposing group, and value
zero if they received the low forecast. We control for age, gender, whether an individual completed uni-
versity education, whether the respondent answered the survey targeted at the left, a dummy for living
in the city of the rally, a dummy for the city in which the rally took place, previous rally experience, a
measure of perception of the AfD, a measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure
of whether people main participate in rallies to express their opinion.
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Table A11: Main results including all interaction terms
Posterior Beliefs Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Own high 0.032 0.339 0.048 0.127
(0.252) (0.254) (0.255) (0.256)
Own high × AfD protest -0.272∗∗ -0.008 -0.242∗∗ -0.225∗∗
(0.123) (0.127) (0.107) (0.108)
Own high × High education 0.139 0.349∗∗∗ 0.021 0.003
(0.120) (0.130) (0.107) (0.110)
Own high ×Male 0.009 -0.210∗ 0.084 -0.008
(0.123) (0.119) (0.111) (0.117)
Own high × Age -0.001 -0.009∗∗ -0.004 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Own high × Local 0.172 0.065 0.110 0.118
(0.118) (0.116) (0.114) (0.115)
Own high × # prev. protests -0.004 -0.015 0.010 0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
Own high × Erfurt 0.350∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ -0.036 -0.040
(0.129) (0.138) (0.120) (0.125)
Own high × Protest effectiveness 0.019 -0.024 -0.005 -0.021
(0.041) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039)
Own high × Expressive motives 0.029 0.002 0.030 -0.033
(0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037)
Other high -0.100 0.461∗ -0.013 -0.067
(0.251) (0.260) (0.252) (0.252)
Other high × AfD protest -0.050 -0.014 0.013 0.030
(0.123) (0.128) (0.107) (0.107)
Other high × High education 0.149 0.101 0.090 0.151
(0.120) (0.130) (0.108) (0.110)
Other high ×Male -0.241∗ -0.087 0.027 0.019
(0.123) (0.121) (0.109) (0.116)
Other high × Age 0.003 -0.007∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Other high × Local 0.073 -0.123 0.164 0.101
(0.119) (0.118) (0.113) (0.114)
Other high × # prev. protests 0.027∗ 0.006 0.024∗ 0.028∗∗
(0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
Other high × Erfurt 0.129 0.190 0.005 0.009
(0.130) (0.137) (0.120) (0.125)
Other high × Protest effectiveness -0.050 -0.019 -0.035 -0.021
(0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039)
Other high × Expressive motives 0.035 0.071∗ -0.041 -0.032
(0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.037)
Number of observations 1464 1464 1464 1464
Notes: This table presents the main results including interaction terms with all control variables. “At-
tend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported on a four point scale (4, Yes;
3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes (z)” is a standardized dummy
variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. “Own high” takes value 1 if respondents
received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero if they received the low forecast. “Other
high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the opposing group, and value zero if
they received the low forecast. In addition to the displayed coefficients, we control for the levels of age,
gender, whether an individual completed university education, whether the respondent answered the
survey targeted at the left, a dummy for living in the city of the rally, a dummy for the city in which
the rally took place, previous rally experience, a measure of perception of the AfD, a measure of beliefs
about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people main participate in rallies to express
their opinion.
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Table A12: Main experimental results – no controls
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 0.413∗∗∗ 0.037 0.198∗∗ 0.157∗
(0.083) (0.085) (0.086) (0.087)
Other high 0.113 0.370∗∗∗ 0.098 0.108
(0.083) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high 0.170∗∗ -0.046 -0.101 -0.078
(0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Other high 0.006 0.273∗∗∗ 0.012 0.040
(0.067) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Own high 0.02 0.44 0.01 0.03
Other high 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.54
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from support-
ers of the AfD rally. “Attend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported
on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes
(z)” is a standardized dummy variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. “Own
high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero
if they received the low forecast. “Other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high
forecast for the opposing group, and value zero if they received the low forecast.
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Table A13: Main experimental results – not standardized
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own Other Attend Yes
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 1757.936∗∗∗ -91.700 0.210∗∗ 0.058∗
(483.479) (387.866) (0.095) (0.035)
Other high 631.543 1639.053∗∗∗ 0.092 0.041
(487.753) (394.397) (0.094) (0.035)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high 558.840 -474.852 -0.189∗∗ -0.061∗∗
(402.126) (339.935) (0.079) (0.030)
Other high -198.403 779.860∗∗ 0.049 0.032
(403.955) (337.876) (0.079) (0.030)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality in A and B (p-value)
Own high 0.05 0.45 0.00 0.01
Other high 0.19 0.10 0.72 0.85
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from sup-
porters of the AfD rally. “Attend” are intentions to participate in the rally reported on a four
point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes” is a
dummy variable that indicates answering yes to the same question.“Own high” takes value 1 if
respondents received the high forecast for the own group, and value zero if they received the low
forecast. “Other high” takes value 1 if respondents received the high forecast for the opposing
group, and value zero if they received the low forecast.
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Table A14: Main results: difference in forecast – no controls
Posterior Beliefs Intention Intention
Own (z) Other (z) Attend (z) Yes (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Difference 0.150∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ 0.050 0.024
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053)
Observations 567 567 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Difference 0.082∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.056 -0.059
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044)
Observations 897 897 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Difference 0.33 0.91 0.13 0.23
Notes: Panel A shows data from supporters of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from support-
ers of the AfD rally. “Attend (z)” are standardized intentions to participate in the rally reported
on a four point scale (4, Yes; 3, uncertain but probably; 2 uncertain, but probably not; 1, no). “Yes
(z)” is a standardized dummy variable that indicates answering yes to the same question. Differ-
ence takes value -1 if the own rally is predicted to be smaller than the competing rally, takes value
0 if the own rally and competing rally are predicted to be of equal size and takes value 1 if the
own rally is predicted to be larger than the competing rally.
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Table A15: Main results: behavioral measure of rally participation (Berlin)
Left email (z) Sent photo (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 0.088 0.192∗
(0.102) (0.114)
Other high 0.099 0.200∗
(0.103) (0.110)
Observations 417 417
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high -0.017 -0.085
(0.093) (0.104)
Other high -0.007 -0.142∗
(0.091) (0.085)
Observations 542 542
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Own high 0.44 0.07
Other high 0.51 0.01
Notes: This table uses data only from the rally in Berlin. Panel A shows data from supporters of
the counterrally. Panel B shows data from supporters of the AfD rally. “Left email (z)” is the stan-
dardized value of a dummy variable that takes value one for respondents who provided us with
their email address in order to participate in the lottery of the photo competition”. “Sent photo
(z)” is the standardized value of a dummy variable that takes value one if respondents actually
sent us a photo of their participation in the rally. We control for age, gender, whether an individ-
ual completed university education, whether the respondent answered the survey targeted at the
left, a dummy for living in Berlin, previous rally experience, a measure of perception of the AfD,
a measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people mainly
participate in rallies to express their opinion.
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Table A16: Main results: behavioral measure of rally participation (pooled)
Left email (z) Sent photo (z)
Panel A: Left-wing protest
Own high 0.018 0.119
(0.085) (0.074)
Other high 0.075 0.133∗
(0.086) (0.074)
Observations 567 567
Panel B: Right-wing protest
Own high -0.021 -0.046
(0.069) (0.059)
Other high -0.038 -0.086∗
(0.069) (0.050)
Observations 897 897
Panel C: Test for equality of coefficients in A and B (p-values)
Own high 0.66 0.10
Other high 0.28 0.01
Notes: This table uses data from the rallies in Berlin and Erfurt. Panel A shows data from support-
ers of the counterrally. Panel B shows data from supporters of the AfD rally. “Left email (z)” is
the standardized value of a dummy variable that takes value one for respondents who provided
us with their email address in order to participate in the lottery of the photo competition”. “Sent
photo (z)” is the standardized value of a dummy variable that takes value one if respondents
actually sent us a photo of their participation in the rally (“Sent photo (z)” is set to zero for re-
spondents from Erfurt where we did not receive any photos). We control for age, gender, whether
an individual completed university education, whether the respondent answered the survey tar-
geted at the left, a dummy for living in Berlin, previous rally experience, a measure of perception
of the AfD, a measure of beliefs about the effectiveness of rallies and a measure of whether people
mainly participate in rallies to express their opinion.
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C Deviations from the pre-analysis plan
We pre-registered the trial based on the Berlin rally on the AEA RCT registry under the
trial id. Given the very similar design of the Berlin and Erfurt trials, we decided to no
submit a second pre-analysis plan prior to the Erfurt rally. For our final analysis, we
deviate from the pre-analysis plan in the following ways:
• Throughout the analysis we display the treatment effects for the AfD and the left-wing sam-
ple separately and do not pool across the two samples.
• We z-scored all outcomes to facilitate interpretation across the two rally contexts.
• We do not include whether individuals entered the email address in the main results Table
because of too little variation. We display the treatment effects on leaving the email and on
sending a picture in Tables A15 and A16. We do not show the results separately for the Erfurt
rally because of the low response rate. For the same reason we also do not present treatment
effects on an index of the outcomes.
• We did not pre-register the survey in the context of the Erfurt rallies as the rallies were only
announced 3 days before they took place, and we did not have any time to register the anal-
ysis before collecting the data.
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D Conceptual framework
D.1 Setup
This section describes a stylized framework of how an individual i decides whether to
attend the rally. We assume that there are two rallies, own and other, where individual i
is considering whether to attend her own rally.
i’s utility function takes the following form:
ui(ni) = αi f (nown + ni, nother)︸ ︷︷ ︸
instrumental motives
+(1− αi) g(nown)ni︸ ︷︷ ︸
social motives
−ci · ni (3)
With nown being turnout on i’s side excluding i, and nother being turnout on the oppos-
ing side. We take nown and nother as fixed as we experimentally manipulate beliefs about
these numbers. ni is 1 if i turns out at the rally and 0 otherwise.9 αi ∈ [0, 1] represents
the relative weight i puts on instrumental relative to social motives. ci ≥ 0 is the individ-
ual cost of attending the rally which we assume to be distributed with continuous and
differentiable CDF Ψ(ci).
Instrumental motives i gains utility from having a large rally on her side, regard-
less of whether she personally attends. We model this through the function f (nown +
ni, nother) which we assume to be continuous and twice differentiable. The production
function captures the fact that rallies can influence political decisions and that size of
rallies matters for the strength of subsequent political outcomes (Madestam et al., 2013).
In line with these stylized facts, we assume that the utility gained from the rally is in-
creasing in total attendance at one’s own rally ( f ′nown > 0). As the setting here is one of
confrontational rallies, it seems plausible that the number of participants of the competi-
tor rally matters for the success of i’s side. The more counterprotesters turn out, the lower
the overall utility gained for a given level of own turnout ( f ′nother < 0). We further assume
that the return to own turnout is increasing in the opposition turnout ( f ′′nown,nother > 0) and
that there are decreasing returns to turnout on i’s side ( f ′′nown < 0).
9While individual i faces a discrete choice, we approximate nown as beeing continuous as the number of
participants on both sides is large in our context.
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Social motives Social motives are increasing in turnout on i’s side (g′nown) but i only
experiences these returns if she decides to attend the rally. This specification reflects
the notion that rallies can be thought of as relational goods whose consumption value
increases when consumed jointly (Uhlaner, 1989a). Specifically, both rallies in our setting
exhibited aspects of street parties with cheerful music being played throughout the day
and relatively well-known bands playing on stage.10 We assume that turnout at the
competitor rally does not influence the social returns to attending the rally as rallies were
strictly separated by the police.
D.2 Strategic interactions with activist on i’s own side
How does individual i’s ex-ante probability of attending the rally change with changes
in turnout at i’s own rally? Result 1 implies that the effect of nown on i’s probability to
attend the rally is ambiguous.
Result 1. For each combination of nown and nother there exist an α∗ such that the probability of
attending a rally is locally decreasing in nown if αi > α∗ and locally increasing in nown if αi < α∗.
Result 1 emphasizes the crucial role of the relative strength of social and instrumen-
tal motives for the nature of the strategic interaction between activists on the same side.
In particular, individuals with strong instrumental concerns will exhibit strategic substi-
tutability, while individuals with strong social motives will exhibit strategic complemen-
tarity in attendance on their own side.
Proof of Result 1 i will attend the rally iff ui(ni = 1) > ui(ni = 0). Using equation 3
yields.
αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown) > ci (4)
We can calculate the probability of i attending the rally as
10Note that this description of rallies differs fundamentally from protests in autocratic countries where
the possibility of a crackdown is an important driver of participation decisions (see for example Cantoni et
al., 2019).
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p(ni = 1) = P(αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown) ≥ ci)
= Ψ (αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown))
To assess the role of expected turnout on one’s own side define
z = αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown) and take the derivatives of
P(ni = 1) with respect to nown.
∂P(ni = 1)
∂nown
=
∂Ψ(z)
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
αi
(
∂ f (nown + 1, nother)
∂nown
− ∂ f (nown, nother)
∂nown
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0, because of decreasing returns
+(1− αi) dg(nown)dnown︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0

(5)
The sign of ∂P(ni=1)∂nown is thus determined the remainder of the equation.
αi
(
∂ f (nown+1,nother)
∂nown −
∂ f (nown,nother)
∂nown
)
+ (1− αi) dg(nown)dnown is a linear combination of a nega-
tive and positive term. Applying the mean value theorem yields Result 1.
D.3 Strategic interactions with the opposing side
Our framework also yields predictions about the nature of the strategic interaction with
the opposing side. As i does not have any social motives with respect to the competitor
rally, the effect of nother on the probability to participate is unambiguous.
Result 2. The probability of attending the rally is globally increasing in nother. Thus, own atten-
dance and turnout at the opposing rally are strategic complements.
One corrolary of Result 2 is that the relative strength of instrumental and social con-
cerns should not matter for the nature of strategic interactions between different rally
groups.
Proof of Result 2 We can calculate the probability of i attending the rally as
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P(ni = 1) = P(αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown) ≥ ci)
= Ψ (αi ( f (nown + 1, nother)− f (nown, nother)) + (1− αi)g(nown))
To assess the role of expected turnout on one’s own side take the derivatives of P(ni =
1) with respect to nother.
∂P(ni = 1)
∂nother
=
∂Ψ(z)
∂z︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
αi
(
∂ f (nown + 1, nother)
∂nother
− ∂ f (nown, nother)
∂nother
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0, by assumption
 > 0
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E Experimental instructions in English
E.1 Berlin: AfD supporter survey
Questionnaire about Protests for the AfD Thank you for your interest in our question-
naire! The goal of this study is to examine participation in political protests. This study
is conducted by researchers at the Universities of Oxford and Konstanz.
The questionnaire will not take longer than 5 minutes. The results will be used exclu-
sively for scientific purposes and will not be shared with a third party. You can end
your participation in this study at any time by closing the browser window. The sur-
vey is authorized by the central ethics committee of the University of Oxford. Thank
you for your time and support. Would you like to participate in the study? Yes, No
Should you have any questions about the study, you can email the researchers at fra-
gen.proteststudie@gmail.com or the ethics committee of the social science faculty at ethics@
socsci.ox.ac.uk.
Next we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself. How old are you?
What is your sex?
Male, Female
What is the highest diploma or degree you have obtained?
No diploma, Hauptschule, Realschule, Abitur, Completed vocational training, Com-
pleted degree at higher learning institution
Do you currently live in Berlin or its surrounding area?
To what degree do you agree with the following statements?
I go to protests primarily to express my opinions rather than to achieve something.
Protests are an effective means to cause political change.
The AfD is an opportunity for a positive transformation in Germany.
Disagree, Rather not agree, Neutral, Rather agree, Agree
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Political Attitudes
How many political demonstrations have you already attended?
Which party do you most closely align with? CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, The Left, Bündnis
90/Greens, CSU, None, Other
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has called for a demonstration on May 27th in Berlin.
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
In reaction to the demonstration by the AfD, the alliance Stop the Hate has called for
a counterdemonstration also on May 27th. The alliance is supported by the national
associations of the Greens, the Left and the SPD, among others. How many counter-
demonstrators do you believe will protest against the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
Expert Opinions
We asked various experts about the turnout of participants to both demonstrations. One
expert estimates that around 10,000 pro-AfD demonstrators will participate. Another ex-
pert estimates that around 10,000 counterdemonstrators will turn out.
This means that the experts believe that the number of demonstrators at the counter-
demonstration will be exactly as large as that of the pro-AfD protest.
In light of the opinion of the experts, how many demonstrators do you believe will take
part in each protest?
Pro-AfD Protest
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
How many counterdemonstrators do you believe will protest against the AfD?
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How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
Participation in the Protest
The AfD demonstration will occur this Sunday, the 27th of May at 12:00 at Washington-
Platz in front of the Berlin Central Station. You can find more information by under the
following link: www.afd.de/demo-berlin Do you plan to participation in the demonstra-
tion organized by the AfD on May 27th?
Yes, uncertain but probably, uncertain but probably not, no
Photo Competition
We would like to better understand how many people will participate in the demonstra-
tion. To that end, we want to collect pictures taken by the demonstrators of the protest.
We would be pleased if you sent us a photo of the demonstration. You can send the photo
to the following email address: proteststudie@gmail.com
If you would like to participate in this competition, please note down this email address.
Photo Competition
All participants who send a picture and register their email address will be entered into
a raffle to win one of five Amazon giftcards in the amount of 50 euros.
In order to ensure that all participants only enter once, we request that you enter the
email-address from which you will send the photo below. We will use the email address
exclusively for the study. Submissions from unregistered email addresses can unfortu-
nately not be entered into the raffle for the Amazon-gift cards.
Your email address?
E.2 Berlin: counterrally
Thank you for your interest in our questionnaire! The goal of this study is to examine
participation in political protests. This study is conducted by researchers at the Univer-
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sities of Oxford and Konstanz.
The questionnaire will not take longer than 5 minutes. The results will be used exclu-
sively for scientific purposes and will not be shared with a third party.
You can end your participation in this study at any time by closing the browser window.
The survey is authorized by the central ethics committee of the University of Oxford.
Thank you for your time and support.
Would you like to participate in the study?
Yes, No
Should you have any questions about the study, you can email the researchers at fra-
gen.proteststudie@gmail.com or the ethics committee of the social science faculty at ethics@socsci.ox.ac.uk.
Next we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.
How old are you?
What is your sex? Male, Female, Other, I don’t want to say
What is the highest diploma or degree you have obtained?
No diploma, Hauptschule, Realschule, Abitur, Completed vocational training, Com-
pleted degree at higher learning institution
Do you currently live in Berlin or its surrounding area? Yes, No
To what degree do you agree with the following statements?
I go to protests primarily to express my opinions rather than to achieve something.
Protests are an effective means to cause political change.
The AfD poses a serious threat to democracy in Germany.
Answers: Disagree, Rather disagree than agree, Neutral, Rather agree than disagree,
Agree
How many political demonstrations have you already attended?
Which party do you most closely align with? CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, The Left, Bündnis
90/Greens, CSU, None, Other
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The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has called for a demonstration on May 27th in Berlin.
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
In reaction to the demonstration by the AfD, the alliance Stop the Hate has called for a
counterdemonstration on May 27. The alliance is supported by the national associations
of the Greens, the Left and the SPD, among others. How many counterdemonstrators do
you believe will protest against the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
Expert Opinions
We asked various experts about the turnout of participants at both demonstrations. One
expert estimates, that approximately 5000 pro-AfD demonstrators will participate. An-
other expert estimates that approximately 10,000 counterdemonstrators will take part.
This means the experts believe that the number of counterdemonstrators will be larger
than that of the pro-AfD demonstrators.
In light of the opinion of the experts, how many demonstrators do you believe will take
part in each protest?
Pro-AfD Protest
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
How certain are you about your estimate for the AfD demonstration?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
How many counterdemonstrators do you believe will protest against the AfD?
How certain are you about your estimate for the counterprotest?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
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Participation in the Demonstration
The alliance Stop the Hate’s demonstration will occur this Sunday, the 27th of May at
11:30 at the Reichstagswiese in front of the Bundestag. You can find more information
under the following link: stopptdenhass.org
Do you plan to participate in the demonstration organized by the alliance Stop the Hate?
Yes, uncertain but probably, uncertain but probably not, no
Photo Competition
We would like to better understand how many people will participate in the demonstra-
tion. To that end, we want to collect pictures taken by the demonstrators of the protest.
We would be pleased if you sent us a photo of the demonstration. You can send the photo
to the following email address: proteststudie@gmail.com
If you would like to participate in this competition, please note down this email address.
Photo Competition
All participants who send a picture and register their email address will be entered into
a raffle to win one of five Amazon giftcards in the amount of 50 euros.
In order to ensure that all participants only enter once, we request that you enter the
email-address from which you will send the photo below. We will use the email address
exclusively for the study. Submissions from unregistered email addresses can unfortu-
nately not be entered into the raffle for the Amazon-gift cards.
Your email address?
E.3 Erfurt rally
Questionnaire about political demonstrations
Thank you for your interest in our questionnaire! The goal of this study is to examine
the participation in political protests. This study is conducted by researchers at the Uni-
versities of Oxford and Konstanz.
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The survey will not take longer than 5 minutes. The results will exclusively be used for
scientific purposes and will not be shared with a third party.
You can end your participation in this study at any time by closing the browser window.
The survey is authorized by the central ethics committee of the University of Oxford.
Thank you for your time and support. Would you like to participate in the study?
Yes No
Should you have any questions about the study, you can email the researchers at fra-
gen.proteststudie@gmail.com or the ethics committee of the social science faculty at ethics@
socsci.ox.ac.uk.
Next we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.
How old are you?
What is your sex? Male, Female, Other, I don’t want to say
What is the highest diploma or degree you have obtained? No diploma, Hauptschule,
Realschule, Abitur, Completed vocational training, Completed degree at higher learning
institution
Do you currently live in Erfurt or its surrounding area? Yes, No
To what degree do you agree with the following statements?
I go to protests primarily to express my opinions rather than to achieve something.
Protests are an effective means to cause political change.
The AfD poses a serious threat to democracy in Germany.
The AfD is an opportunity for a positive transformation in Germany.
Disagree, Rather disagree, Neutral, Rather agree, Agree
Political Attitudes
How many political demonstrations have you already attended?
Which party do you most closely align with? CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, The Left, Bündnis
90/Greens, CSU, None, Other
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) has called for a demonstration on May 1st in Erfurt.
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Among others, Alexander Gauland and Björn Hocke are expected to speak.
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
In reaction to the demonstration by the AfD, the alliance Stand Together! has called for a
counterdemonstration also on May 1st. The alliance is supported by the national associ-
ations of the Greens, the Left and the SPD, as well as the local branch of the CDU, among
others.
How many counterdemonstrators do you believe will protest against the AfD?
Your estimate:
How certain are you about your estimate?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
Expert Opinions
We asked various experts about the turnout of participants to both demonstrations. One
expert estimates that around 3,000 pro-AfD demonstrators will participate. Another ex-
pert estimates that around 1,000 counterdemonstrators will turn out.
This means that the experts believe that the number of demonstrators at the counter-
demonstration would be smaller than that of the pro-AfD demonstration.
In light of the opinion of the experts, how many demonstrators do you believe will take
part in each protest? Pro-AfD Protest
How many demonstrators do you believe will protest for the AfD?
How certain are you about your estimate for the AfD demonstration?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
How many counterdemonstrators do you believe will protest against the AfD?
How certain are you about your estimate for the counterdemonstration?
Very uncertain, uncertain, relatively uncertain, relatively certain, certain, very certain
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Participation in the Demonstration
The alliance Stand Together!’s demonstration will occur this Wednesday, the 1st of May,
at 10:00 in front of the state chancellery in Erfurt (Regierungsstraße 73). You can find
more information under the following link: http://zusammenstehen.eu Do you plan
to participate in the demonstration organized by the alliance Stand Together on this
Wednesday, May 1st? Yes, uncertain but probably, uncertain but probably not, no
Participation in the Demonstration
The first of May demonstration of the AfD will occur this Wednesday, the 1st of May, at
10:30 on Juri-Gagarin-Ring Ecke Lüberstraße in Erfurt. You can find more information
under the following link: afd-thueringen.de/
E.4 Additional descriptive survey
Next we would like to ask you a few questions about yourself.
How old are you?
What is your sex? Male, Female, Other, I don’t want to say
What is the highest diploma or degree you have obtained? No diploma, Hauptschule,
Realschule, Abitur, Completed vocational training, Completed degree at higher learning
institution
Do you currently live in Berlin or its surrounding area?
Personal Attitudes
Are you overall a risk-seeking person or do you try to avoid risk?
Please answer using the following scale, where the value 0 means not at all risk-seeking
and the value 10 means very risk-seeking. The in-between values can be used to temper
your responses.
Your Answer: Not at all risk-seeking, Very risk-seeking
Do you like to participate in competitions or do you rather avoid them?
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Please answer using the following scale, where the value 0 means you avoid compe-
titions at all costs and the value 10 means you actively seek out competition. The in-
between values can be used to temper your responses.
Your Answer: Avoid competition at all costs, Actively seek out competition
To what degree do you agree with the following statements?
I go to protests primarily to express my opinion rather than to achieve something.
Protests are an effective means to cause political change.
It’s fun to participate in political demonstrations.
Attending political demonstrations shows my friends and acquaintances that I am polit-
ically engaged.
The AfD poses a serious threat to democracy in Germany.
The AfD is an opportunity for a positive transformation in Germany.
How many political demonstrations have you already attended?
How many of your friends have attended at least one political demonstration?
How many people do you know that have attended at least one political demonstration?
Which party do you most closely align with? CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, The Left, Bündnis
90/Greens, CSU, None, Other
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F Facebook adverts
Figure A6: Right-wing Facebook advert
Notes: This figure shows the Facebook advert targeted at AfD supporters. The text trans-
lates as: “Why do people protest to support the AfD? Take part in our five-minute scientific
survey. As a thank you, we will distribute Amazon vouchers worth 150 Euros.”
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Figure A7: Right-wing Facebook advert
Notes: This figure shows the Facebook advert targeted at left-wing activists. The text trans-
lates as: “Why do people protest against right-wing tendencies? Take part in our five-
minute scientific survey. As a thank you, we will distribute Amazon vouchers worth 150
Euros.”
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